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Abstract—The increasing accessibility of data provides sub-
stantial opportunities for understanding user behaviors. Un-
earthing anomalies in user behaviors is of particular importance
as it helps signal harmful incidents such as network intrusions,
terrorist activities, and financial frauds. Many visual analytics
methods have been proposed to help understand user behavior-
related data in various application domains. In this work, we
survey the state of art in visual analytics of anomalous user
behaviors and classify them into four categories including social
interaction, travel, network communication, and transaction. We
further examine the research works in each category in terms
of data types, anomaly detection techniques, and visualization
techniques, and interaction methods. Finally, we discuss findings
and potential research directions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing accessibility of data collected from various
sources provides potential opportunities for understanding
user behaviors. Identifying anomalies in user behaviors is
of particular interest in many application domains such as
cybersecurity, urban planning, and social media. For instance,
detecting rumors and tracking their spreading patterns alert
people to the risks of being influenced by misinformation,
which is especially critical in political elections.
Detecting anomalous user behaviors is a challenging task
as the boundary between abnormal and normal data cannot
be clearly defined. Even equipped with domain knowledge,
analysts may find results of automatic machine learning
approaches lack contextual information to support decision-
making, e.g., analysts are limited to exploring who did what
when and where, why (5W’s) and how. To address the issue,
visualization integrates human knowledge into information
processing tasks. It presents anomalous patterns intuitively to
decision makers as well as involves a human-machine dialog
as they interact with the data set. Our work aims to sum-
marize the-state-of-art in visual analytics of anomalous user
behaviors, with the purpose of highlighting current research
trends as well as future directions.
In this survey, we contribute a taxonomy of visual analytics
of anomalous user behaviors. The overview of the analytical
pipeline is summarized in Figure 1.
• We categorize four user behaviors, including social in-
teraction, travel, network communication, and transaction
based on the data collected from specific data sources. We
extract four common data types from these four behaviors,
including text, network, spatiotemporal information, and
multidimensional data.
• We review how research works use visualization techniques
combined with interaction methods to analyze anomalous
user behaviors. We extract six visualization techniques,
including sequence visualization, graph visualization, text
visualization, geographic visualization, chart visualization,
and glyph visualization. We also summarize six interaction
methods, including tracking & monitoring, exploration &
navigation, pattern discovery, knowledge externalization,
and refinement & identification.
The remaining survey is organized as follows. First, we
describe related surveys in Section II. Then, we present the
taxonomy, methodology, and taxonomy used in this survey
in Section III. Section IV, V, VI, and VII analyze the four
user behaviors respectively using the taxonomies explained
in Section III. Analysis of each behavior follows the general
visual analytics pipeline. We start with identifying data types
and anomaly detection techniques, visualization techniques
and interaction methods are then discussed. Finally, we dis-
cuss findings and trends acquired from surveying papers in
Section VIII and conclude our work in Section IX.
II. RELATED SURVEYS
In this section, we discuss related surveys for visual anoma-
lous user behaviors analysis. There are survey papers in
the literature that focus on analyzing user behaviors. Jin
et al. [2] categorize user behaviors in online social network
into four types including connectivity and interaction, traffic
activity, mobile social behavior, and malicious behavior. Jiang
et al. [3] classify anomalous behaviors when using web
applications (e.g., Hotmial, Facebook, Amazon) into four
categories: traditional spam, fake reviews, social spam, and
link farming. Surveys regarding visualization of user behaviors
data explore application domains such as urban computing [4],
social media [5], [6], financial domain [7], and network
security [8], [9]. In the field of anomaly detection, Chandola
et al. introduce categories of anomaly detection (AD) tech-
niques [1]. [10] and [11] examine techniques used in intrusion
detection systems and for detecting graph-based anomalies,
respectively. Recent work of Chalapathy and Chawla [12]
present a structured overview of research approaches in deep
learning-based anomaly detection. Our survey covers a wider
range of application domains than existing surveys. To the best
of our knowledge, it is the first survey that explores anomalous
user behaviors from a perspective of visual analytics.
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Fig. 1. Taxonomy of this survey, addressing the data type, anomaly detection techniques [1], visualization techniques, and interaction methods in the visual
analysis of anomalous user behaviors.
III. TERMINOLOGY, METHODOLOGY, AND TAXONOMY
In this section, we first explain the terminology used in
this survey and describe our methodology of selecting papers
suitable for the topic of the survey. Next, we introduce the
taxonomy of anomalous user behaviors regarding common
data types, anomaly detection techniques, visualization, and
interaction methods.
A. Terminology
The survey aims to summarize visualization works that
focus on anomalous user behaviors. Here, user behaviors
can be derived directly and indirectly from user actions. For
example, posting a tweet is a behavior directly related to user
actions while a cyber-attack is conducted by nodes in networks
but indirectly manipulated by the perpetrator. Investigation of
user behavior focuses on tracking, collecting, and assessing
patterns caused by users’ as opposed to information of devices
and events [13], [14]. Analyzing and identifying anomalous
user behaviors uses anomaly detection techniques. According
to Chandola et al. [1], anomalies are “patterns in data that
do not conform to a well-defined notion of normal behavior”.
As we collect research works from a diverse set of domains
such as social media, finance, and cybersecurity, the scope of
anomaly detection in our survey is broader than the scope iden-
tified in specific domains. For example, e.g., Chen et al. [5]
identify data outside normal ranges of attributes as anomalies
in social media while in the field of cybersecurity, anomalies
refer to malware, insider threats, and targeted attacks [13],
[14]. In our work, anomalies refer to frauds, spam, intrusion,
sudden increases in the volume of data, and periodic patterns
of users, etc. In short, as long as results detected express
“interestingness of real-life relevance” [1], we claim that the
visualization works are within the scope of anomaly detection.
B. Methodology
Our interested range of publications is constrained by three
conditions: user behaviors, anomaly detection, and visual
analytics/visualization. We started from a core set of relevant
research works known to us in advance, and followed refer-
ences from “Related Work” as well as papers that cite the
previously identified papers. We also conducted a keyword
search for papers published in visualization conferences or
journals. Examples of keywords are “anomaly, anomalous,
outlier, abnormal, unusual” and “rare”. The research papers
were checked to affirm that they are indeed associated with the
concept of anomaly in [1]. The association with user behaviors
was expected to be seen in Case Study section in publications.
During the process of investigating research works, we found
that the range of pertinent papers is relatively narrow. To solve
the potential shortage in the number of references, our survey
range covered publications that incorporate anomaly detection
as one of their visual analytic approaches in addition to those
that solely address the issue of anomaly detection, e.g., we
include [15] in our collection through the authors’ ultimate
goal is predictive analysis of event evolution.
We also keep our exploration spectrum balanced in terms of
application domains. We noticed the number of publications
related to travel and network communication outnumber oth-
ers. The outnumbering of travel probably results from the early
history of visualizing spatiotemporal data (in 1869 Charles
Minard produced a map to illustrate Napoleon’s March to
Moscow) and continuous study ever since. As for cyberse-
curity, the establishment of a conference for visualization of
cybersecurity, IEEE Symposium on Visualization for Cyber
Security (VizSec), encourages researchers to devote efforts in
this field. As such, we allocated more time to searching for
research works of other user behaviors comparatively. We are
hoping to capture possibly interesting relationships across user
behaviors by maintaining a broad scope of investigation.
C. Taxonomy
Based on a literature review of more than 150 papers that
relevant to visual analytics of anomalous user behaviors, we
summarize four user behaviors including social interaction,
travel, network communication, and transaction. For each
of the four user behaviors, we attempt to identify common
data types, anomaly detection techniques, visualization, and
interaction methods. The different categories are highlighted
in the overall pipeline of visual analytics in Figure 1. The
selected papers are summarized in Table 2, with color indicates
each category.
User Behaviors. User behaviors are seen in a variety
of application domains. Based on the data collected form
specific data sources, we classify user behaviors into four
categories: social interaction, travel, network communication,
and transaction. Social interaction describes the communi-
cation of ideas and thoughts between people. Its data is
collected from publicly accessible social platforms or private
telecommunication platforms. Travel is the physical movement
of users between places containing geographic information.
Its data is collected from Global Positioning System (GPS),
mobile phones and base stations, etc. Network communication
is sending and receiving information between machines via
networks. Its data is collected from server logs. Transaction
refers to monetary flows in buying and selling, whose data is
collected from system logs.
We also categorize anomalous user behaviors into egocentric
and collective behaviors. The categorization is inspired by
the concepts of point and collective anomalies [1]. Note that
our survey focuses on the investigation of anomalous user
behaviors which constitutes a subset of anomalies. Egocentric
behavior refers to the user behavior that distinguishes itself
from the rest of data in anomaly detection. Collective behavior
is a set of user behaviors that appear anomalous. When
analyzing separate user behaviors categorized into collective
behavior, they may appear normal on an individual basis.
As egocentric and collective behaviors emphasize different
aspects, specific visualization designs should be introduced.
It will be discussed when analyzing visualization techniques
in the following sections.
Data Types. A variety of data can be extracted from user
behaviors across different domains. By analyzing multiple
attributes of these data, we summarize four common data
types including text, network, spatiotemporal information, and
multidimensional data [3], [5]. A brief explanation for each
data types is described as follows. Text provides semantic
information of identities and backgrounds objects. Network,
also called subgraph, consists of a set of nodes interlinked
with a set of edges. A formal definition of a graph can be
found in [16]. Spatiotemporal information captures spatial
and temporal attributes of data. Multidimensional data uses
multiple attributes to describe the properties of objects. A
detailed explanation of data types for each user behavior is
introduced in the following sections.
Anomaly Detection Techniques. The categorization of
anomaly detection techniques used in this survey is bor-
rowed from the survey written by Chandola et al. [1]. The
six categories are classification-based, nearest neighbor-based,
clustering-based, statistical, information theoretic, and spectral
anomaly detection techniques. Classification-based anomaly
detection techniques develop models in the training phase and
distinguish anomalies from normal data instances in the testing
phase. In the training phase, classifiers are learned via training
a set of data instances. In the testing phase, test instances are
classified into one of the classes - normal or anomalous. Near-
est neighbor-based techniques compute anomaly scores from
distance or relative density measures in a community. Anoma-
lies are separated using distance-based nearest neighbor-based
techniques, which calculate anomaly scores based on dis-
tance to its kth nearest neighbor. Clustering-based techniques
group similar data instances into clusters, and separate normal
instances from anomalous instances. Statistical techniques
presume probability distributions of data instances. Outliers
are found in space of low probability whilst normal instances
are observed with a high probability of occurrence. Statistical
techniques can be further divided into parametric and non-
parametric anomaly detection techniques providing whether
there exists a model structure a priori. Information theoretic
techniques analyze information content using measures such as
entropy, relative entropy and Kolomogorov Complexity. Spec-
tral techniques aim to find an approximation of the data by
decomposing the problems and constructing suitable attributes.
The attributes or components can then be embedded into lower
dimensional subspace in which anomalous instances can be
distinguished from normal instances. A detailed explanation
of categories and sub-categories can be referred to [1].
We focus our discussion on visualization works that apply
anomaly detection techniques. A small proportion of visual
analytic tools manage to detect anomalies by using carefully
designed visualizations from which anomalous data instances
can be visually distinguished from normal ones [17], [18],
[19], [20], [21]. The designs encode attributes and/or fre-
quency using easily recognizable visual channels such as hues,
heights of glyphs, sizes of nodes, etc [22], [21], [23]. We
exclude these papers in the discussion of anomaly detection
techniques.
Visualization Techniques. We categorize visualization
techniques that have been applied to anomalous user be-
haviors, including sequence, graph, text, geographic, chart,
and glyph visualizations. Sequence visualization illustrates
relations between successive events with temporal information.
Anomalous sequences include spreading patterns of rumors,
sudden changes in the volume of posts, and unusual business
processes. Common visual representations are timeline visu-
alization, flow visualization, and parallel coordinates. Graph
visualization shows structured patterns composed of nodes
and edges. Anomalous graph indicates special communication
patterns in a group or communities, financial frauds conducted
between employees and clients, and unauthorized network
traces directed from sources to destinations. Typical graph
visualizations are node-link diagram, circular-based designs
(i.e., a network topology map inside an outer ring), tree, and
matrix. Text visualization focuses on textual data. Anomalous
text is indicated by specific keywords, topics, and sentiments
extracted/abstracted from texts. Word cloud is one of the usual
visualization techniques for text. Text can also be combined
with other visualization techniques such as flow visualization
to present more contextual information. Geographic visual-
ization depicts mobility patterns of people or vehicles in
Fig. 2. The selected papers regarding visualization and visual analytics of anomalous behaviors. DTs: text, network, spatiotemporal information, and
multidimensional data. ADs: classification-based, nearest neighbor-based, clustering-based, statistical, information theoretic, and spectral anomaly detection
techniques. VTs: sequence, graph, text, geographic, chart, and glyph visualizations. ITs: tracking & monitoring, exploration & navigation, knowledge
externalization, pattern discovery, and refinement & identification.
geographic space. Mobility patterns include discrete as well
as continuous patterns. Discrete patterns describe distribution
and co-occurrence while continuous patterns depict trajectories
of users when they move from one point to another. Abnormal
mobility patterns are hot spots, an opposite traveling direction
to most, and uncommon movement when compared to history.
Heat maps and flows/bubbles projection on a geographic map
are used most often for visual analysis of mobility patterns.
Chart visualization and Glyph visualization represent the at-
tributes of a multidimensional data item using a chart (e.g., x-
, y-axis, color of objects) and the feature of an icon (color,
size, shape), respectively. Examples of anomalies include users
who only reply in a discussion board but never initiate a post
and who send an unusual amount of emails at a certain time.
Typical visualization techniques include 2D/3D scatter plot,
bubble chart, bar chart, Gantt chart, etc.
Interaction Methods. Interaction plays an important role in
visual analytics. Based on analyzing interactions methods [24]
used in research works regarding detecting of anomalous user
behaviors, we summarize the categories of interaction tasks
including tracking & monitoring, exploration & navigation,
knowledge externalization, pattern discovery, and refinement
& identification. Analysts may mark data of interest via
click, hover or brush for tracking & monitoring. Analysts
may observe data via panning, zooming, or drill-down/roll-up
functions for exploration & navigation. Analysts may adjust
attributes of data (e.g., color, size, range) to reveal interest-
ing patterns (pattern discovery). Analysts may collect, save,
and extract the current visualization (e.g., take a snapshot)
for knowledge externalization. Analysts may label data with
known identities (i.e., abnormal or normal data item) for
refinement & identification of results.
IV. SOCIAL INTERACTION
Social interaction describes communication of ideas and
thoughts between people. Social interaction can be further
classified into private and public interaction. Private social
interaction behaviors include sending and/or receiving emails,
making phone calls, and sending text messages between
familiars on a normal basis. Examples of anomalous in-
teraction are communication of fraudsters [25], [26] and
criminals [27], [28], emailing patterns of core contributors
in a working group [29], [30] and spam [31]. Public social
interaction behaviors associate with posting/sharing/replying
contents on publicly accessible social platforms. Specifically,
writing reviews on e-commerce platforms and editing articles
in Wikipedia are also counted as public social interaction.
Anomalies related to this interaction consist of diffusion of
rumors [32], [33], social bots [34], [35], and detection of
events [36], [37], [38], [39].
We observe a few differences between private and public
social interactions. The linkage between senders and receivers
is not explicit in public interaction compared to one-on-one
conversations in private. The information accessible on public
platforms is much more than that in private settings, leading to
larger volumes of data collected relevant to public behaviors.
The differences can also be implied from design principles of
visual analytics tools which will be discussed in Section 4.3.
A. Data Types
Text data such as keywords, hashtags, and email contents
help analysts comprehend social interaction behavior, as it
provides information including sentiment, categories, and clus-
ters of text under a certain topic. Gloor et al. [30][40] filter
emails by keywords that are known to be related to crime
patterns. For example, “bonus” means the most important
thing, “investigation” refers to what is coming up for criminals.
TargetVue [34] incorporates content features to detect social
bot accounts. Mentioning of a topic under which sudden
changes in the number of relevant tags are observed, is
regarded as an anomalous behavior. Echeverria et al. [41]
discover a bot network in Twitter by solely mining the textual
features of tweets. They found that the tweets of the botnet
are taken directly from “Star Wars” novels. Beagle [28] allows
analysts to filter contents from a filter set as well as to
construct filters using keywords that are found useful during
the investigation of scamming activities.
As social interaction concerns with passing, sharing, and
exchanging information, network are often seen when con-
versations are held between users. Follower relationship in
social media, back-and-forth communication via emails, and
amendments made by one user in Wikipedia in response to
the edit of another user are considered as network data. Gloor
et al. [30] identify the team leader, practice leader, and prac-
tice coordinator from visualization of social email networks.
These anomalous users are placed in the center of the social
network and connected to multiple nodes. Fu et al. [29]
explore small-scale email networks, where a node represents
an email address, and an edge between two nodes indicates an
email exchange. Analysts are able to identify different email
networks for specific research groups as little communication
is made across different groups. FluxFlow [32] derives user
networks when exploring the process of anomalous informa-
tion spreading. Indegree and outdegree are extracted based on
the interaction graph of a Twitter user. These measures signal
the influential power of the user.
Temporal information can be found from timestamps of
microblogs, time and date of emails and calls, and days when a
user appear on a forum. Location of geo-located microblogs,
the location of calls, and the terrorist network of a country
are spatial data. Temporal data facilitates the analysis of
communication evolution whereas and spatial data explains
where the behavior occurs. Elzen et al. [25], [26] detect
communication bursts using dynamic network visualization.
One important part is the temporal analysis of events (e.g., mo-
bile phone calls), where trends opposite to global trends,
periodic repetition, and a sudden block between homogeneous
behaviors are considered abnormal. CloudLines [42] regards
sudden changes in the number of specific keywords within a
period as anomalies. The keywords are collected from tweets,
which arrive in data streams at non-uniform time intervals.
Some visualization works combine temporal and spatial anal-
ysis in event detection. ScatterBlogs [37], [43] detects events
containing geographic information such as power outages and
disasters from microblogs, and in the meantime represent
messages related to the events on a map.
Multidimensional data for detecting anomalous user behav-
iors include the length of a tweet, number of posts/emails,
and average rating scores in e-commerce platforms. Multi-
dimensional data not only offers comprehensive descriptions
of social interaction, but also helps abstract anomalousness
of behaviors. Webga and Lu [44] detect anomalous ratings
by incorporating multidimensional data into the analysis. The
multidimensional data includes the scores given by every
user at the corresponding time. Rating frauds are discovered
by measuring differences in average ratings and the number
of rating activities in two time windows. Cao et al. [34]
detect anomalous users in social media by carefully selecting
communication features. To investigate the interaction aspect
of a social account, features such as whether users tend to
communicate within a group or spread information in public,
and whether users are responded from others are measured.
FraudVis [45] selects ten features based on the rank of
anomaly score to investigate which features contribute most
to frauds on the Internet. The activity count within different
time periods, for instance, is one of the features that evaluate
the number of views on a video website.
B. Anomaly Detection Techniques
Classification-based techniques are popular in discovering
abnormal social interaction when compared to the applica-
tion of the techniques in the other three user behaviors.
The retrieval of “Star Wars” botnet [41] is achieved with
a naïve Bayesian classifier based solely on textual features.
This basic technique is effective because the tweets posted
by the botnet are cited from the “Star Wars” novels. Scat-
terBlogs2 [38] proposed a supervised, Support Vector Machine
(SVM) classification-based approach to train classifiers as
user-adjustable filters. A random forest algorithm, i.e., rule-
based classification detects misinformation that is spread by
social bots in a supervised approach [35]. RumourLens [33]
analyzes the impact of rumors during the information diffusion
process. It performs iterative expansion of a query set and
iterative refinements of a classifier (ReQ-ReC retriever and
classifier) [49]. The output is a ranked list of tweet clusters that
seem to be rumors, which can be refined by users. FluxFlow
[32] utilizes one-class conditional random fields (OCCRF) to
perform sequential anomaly detection. The OCCRF model
assumes the highly dynamic and one-class nature of anomalies,
and computes an anomaly score by measuring dissimilarity
from unlabeled training samples. The dissimilarity is derived
from the difference of the posterior probability of a normal
label and that of an abnormal label.
Nearest neighbor-based techniques calculate anomaly scores
from distance or density. Metrics such as density, betweenness
centrality, and group degree centrality in networks are the
ranking criteria of homogeneity/risk for Collaborative Inno-
vation Networks [50]. MobiVis [48] incorporates semantic
information of phone calls and geographic proximity into a
heterogeneous graph. Through importance filtering based on
variables such as node degree of a neighborhood, important
nodes and edges can be pruned from interaction with the
ontology graph. TargetVue [34] employs time-adaptive local
outlier factor model to quantify sudden changes of posting or
Fig. 3. Visualizations of anomalous social interaction behaviors. (a) TargetVue [34] uses circle-based glyph visualization to encode individual users’ temporal
posting/reposting behaviors, anomalousness of their behaviors, and correlation between suspicious users. (b) Leadline [46] visualizes event episodes using
horizontal pulse-shaped timeline visualization. (c) FluxFlow [32] shows anomalous information spreading on social media using packed circle timeline
visualization. (d) Chae et al. [47] present public behavior responses to disaster events in microblog using a heat map and hexagons on a map. (e) Mobivis [48]
visualizes the calling behavior of a network consisting of university staff and students using a node-link diagram.
emailing behaviors. A user can be identified as a time-series
vector in multidimensional feature space. Each user is given
an anomaly score computed from features that distinguish
one user from others, and from his/her own history. Kernel
density estimation (KDE) is used for computing continuous
distribution. It scales the parameters of estimation by enabling
the kernel scale to vary based on the distance from the point to
the kth nearest neighbor in a data set. Cloudlines [42] allows
logarithmic distortion of amplifying recent events in time. A
kernel density estimator and a truncation function help focus
on recent events that appear dense in time series. KDE is also
used in [39] to inspect spatiotemporal regularities of topics.
Point patterns are related to continuous regions by comparative
kernel density analysis.
Statistical techniques are used in event detection, where
anomalousness is quantified by measuring differences from
models constructed from history behaviors. TwitInfo [36] finds
peaks from time-series events by considering exponentially
weighted moving average and variance in a time window.
The algorithm starts a new window if a significant increase
in counts relative to the historical mean is encountered. It-
erartive non-parametric regression based on Loess smoothing
decomposes time series of interest to three components: trend,
seasonal, and remainder component. Z-scores of remainder
values are abnormality rating. This novel method was first used
in ScatterBlogs [43]. It was later applied to identify unusual
topics in the selected regions [47] and used as part of predictive
analytics based on topic trends in historic time series [15].
EventRiver [51] applies a clustering-based approach based
on temporal locality in the analysis of streaming texts. The
clusters are related in contents regardless of time spans.
ScatterBlogs [37] uses the Lyold clustering technique to distin-
guish unusual events from general message clusters originating
from high densities in time and space. Episogram [52] select
appropriate features for clustering, and generate clusters that
are always centered at the positions with highest densities
in the data space. FraudVis [45] employs the CopyCatch
algorithm, a graph-based clustering approach to explore fraud
groups who suddenly follow a user in social media on a single
day.
Spectral techniques are used to detect interesting network
structure of editing histories [53] and rating frauds in e-
commerce systems [44]. Brandes et al. [53] abstract weighted
attributes on nodes and edges from users and relationships
between users respectively. A weighted graph is projected into
controversy space where collaboration or competition structure
of two user groups are easily identified. Webga et al. [44] adopt
a dimension reduction algorithm, singular value decomposition
(SVD), to detect fake ratings that are written to boost the
popularity of selected items in e-commerce stores. Once the
suspicion level is raised above a threshold, alerts are sent to
the visualization.
C. Visualization Techniques
Egocentric Behaviors. Egocentric Social Interaction behav-
iors study the role of a user from his/her interaction with
others. Examples of anomalous egocentric behaviors are users
who only reply in a discussion board or who send an unusual
amount of emails at a certain time. We observe that glyph, text,
and graph visualizations are favored visual representations for
egocentric behaviors.
Anomalous user behaviors can be identified via glyph
visualization that are in different appearances to those of
normal ones. Episogram [52] uses arrow-based and arc-based
timelines to demonstrate posting and reposting activities, re-
spectively. The two timelines can be aggregated to obtain over-
all tweeting behaviors. Users who always repost immediately
after a message is posted are identified as arcs that always
start from one end. TargetVue [34] (Figure 3 (a)) tackles the
challenge of discovering social bots in Twitter. The circle-
based glyph visualization facilitates investigation in terms
of topics, sentiments, temporal dynamics of communication
and its impacts, and relationship among accounts. Specifi-
cally, individual users’ temporal posting/reposting behaviors,
anomalousness of their behaviors, and the correlation between
suspicious users are encoded by behavior glyph, feature glyph,
and relation glyph, respectively.
Text visualization can be used to describe egocentric com-
munication patterns in emails [18], [54]. PostHistory [18]
shows the evolution of emailing patterns. It consists of
two views, with one revealing the intensity of exchanged
messages with each contact in a calendar view, and the
other demonstrating how email addresses evolve over time
in movies. Analysts can change addresses’ positions by ver-
tical/circular/alphabetical arrangement. Social Network Frag-
ment [18] represents social networks in a graph where nodes
are replaced by colored names of individuals. The larger the
font of the name, the stronger an individual is tied to others.
Viégas et al. [54] study changes of relationships implied from
changes of keywords in email contents. The frequency and
distinctiveness of keywords can be inferred from the sizes
of texts, and thus anomalies such as changes of relationships
(e.g., from peer to boss) can be inferred.
In addition to glyph and text visualization, graph visualiza-
tion, especially node-link visualization helps detect anomalous
individual behaviors from their social interaction. Li et al. [55]
explore email patterns in two graphical modes: cliques and
email flows. A spam bot is detected in the email flow panel
when only edges originating from one node are visualized.
Gloor et al. [50], [30], [40] investigate communication
patterns of working groups in node-link visualization, and
study the evolution of social structures over time in animation.
Networks are drawn in personalized mode or subject mode to
identify core contributors in groups and important messages,
respectively [50]. The visualization tool TeCFlow [30], [40]
detects the hidden communication structure from the Enron
email corpus. The hierarchical social networks uncover how
Enron employees conduct collusion and frauds by emphasizing
the roles of influencers, gatekeepers, and leaders. Semantic
node-link views enable investigation in terms of email ad-
dresses, keywords or time. Shao et al. [35] evaluate the extent
to which an account expresses similarity to the characteristics
of social bots based on diffusion patterns of tweets. In the
“Hoaxy” platform, a node-link diagram represents the social
networks, with brighter hues indicating higher anomalous
scores.
Collective Behaviors. Collective Social Interaction behav-
iors derived from users acting in a group or acting in response
to each other. Anomalous collective social behaviors include
temporal development of tweets, the reaction of people to spe-
cial incidents, and separate group patterns of communication.
Sequence, geographic, and graph visualizations used often for
collective behaviors.
Sequence visualization represents the evolution of collective
behaviors in various forms such as parallel coordinates and
pulses/bubbles arranged along a timeline visualization. Viégas
et al. [23] visualize revision history of Wikipedia pages
in modified parallel coordinates. Each revised version of an
article is represented by a vertical axis, with the axis’ length
indicating the length of the article. The vertical axis is divided
into parts with each corresponding to revisions made by every
author. By linking the axes together, a modified form of
parallel coordinates shows the competition/mass deletion his-
tories of articles. RumorLens [33] demonstrates the movement
between different states of interaction with a rumor. The main
view shows a Sankey diagram. The number of people exposed
to the rumor and the associated correction is illustrated with
lengths of colored segments (blue for rumors and red for
corrections) in one axis. By linking different states between
axes that correspond to time epochs, analysts can understand
the influence of rumors and the corrections.
Pulses and bubbles arranged according to temporal sequence
illustrate the anomalies of collective social interaction behav-
iors. Major changes in temporal development of texts are
detected by highlighting unusual shapes of timelines. As one
of the earliest visualizations that investigate the emergence of
events, TwitInfo [36] visualizes bursts of events in a line chart.
The highlighted and labeled event peaks suggest events that
trigger heated discussion on Twitter. CloudLines, LeadLine
and EventRiver [42], [46], [51] detect events by relating
volume of text data extracted from online news within a
period of time to temporal density of keywords. Horizontal
pulse-shaped timeline visualization represents event episodes,
with the sizes of pulses indicating the importance of events.
LeadLine (Figure 3 (b)) and EventRiver [46], [51] arrange
vertical positions of events according to similarity of topics.
FluxFlow [32] (Figure 3 (c)) discovers temporal trends and
impacts of users in information spreading process (e.g., ru-
mors). The main view consists of packed circles arranged
along a timeline. A user’s influence (i.e., the number of
followers) and anomaly score are encoded by the size and
color of a circle, respectively. A user can be analyzed from
three perspectives simultaneously: tweet volume, sequence,
and distribution of anomalous accounts. A complementary tree
visualization demonstrates the correlation of user accounts in
the diffusion process.
Geographic visualization is used to reveal events contain-
ing spatial as well as temporal references. With geographic
details, anomalies can be detected from spatial intensities
obtained from a collection of social interaction behaviors. Lee
et al. [56] introduce one of the earliest works of applying
spatiotemporal analysis to social media, where flows of people
are represented as arrows on a map. ScatterBlogs [37], [43]
employ geographic visualization for anomaly detection of
topics and events as well as their spatial and temporal marks.
ScatterBlogs2 [38] uses dots on a map to portray geo-located
microblog posts. It differs from its previous version since there
are two settings in ScatterBlogs2: a classifier creation envi-
ronment and a monitoring environment. Analysts create task-
tailored filters based on messages of well-understood events
in the classifier creation environment, and obtain contexts of
interesting events from a filter orchestration view and a time
slider in the monitoring environment. Thom et al. [37] extract
terms from messages and cluster topics as tag clouds on a
zoomable map. Anomalous events are labeled and positioned
on a map according to its detected location. The “Star Wars”
botnet was discovered by accident when Echeverria et al. [41]
observed sharp boundaries of the latitudinal and longitudinal
position of some tweets, which were generated from bots
considering the unusual spatial distribution.
Heat map, one of the geographic visualizations, is effec-
tive at illustrating geographically-marked microblog messages.
Pozdnoukhov et al. [39] compute heat maps from streaming
tweets. Density of heat maps indicates spatial variability of
population’s response to various stimuli such as large scale
sportive, political or cultural events. The difference in density
between two heat maps implies temporal evolution of events.
Chae et al. [47] (Figure IV (d)) collect a sheer volume
of real-time microblog messages and mine public behavior
response to disasters. A heat map and hexagons on a map
identify spatiotemporal differences between crisis and normal
situations.
Graph visualization including node-link and circular-based
visualization uncover anomalous structures of social inter-
action. Perer and Shneiderman [27] emphasize the need to
examine social networks systematically in SocialAction. The
visualization tool is designed accordingly to encourage in-
teraction with clustered node-link visualization. Analysts can
quickly direct their attention to the most anomalous networks
as nodes/subgroups are colored according to their ranks of
anomalousness. Fu et al. [29] examine small-world email
networks using several visualizations. For example, stacked
displays of graphs on a spherical surface visualize commu-
nication patterns between different groups. A hierarchical
drawing emphasizes important nodes by placing them high
in the hierarchy. MobiVis [48] (Figure 3 (e)) visualizes the
calling behavior of a network consisting of university staff and
students using a node-link diagram. The goal is to investigate
information exchanges and the implicit social relationship. The
researchers design a “behavior ring” for user(s), which arrange
events in a radial form around a node. Analysts study structural
interaction from the correlation between nodes and temporal
interaction from the rings.
Circular-based representation demonstrates collective so-
cial interaction behaviors in a packed visualization. Elzen
et al. [25], [26] combine the circular hierarchical edge
bundle view and massive sequence view (MSV) to detect
unexpected suspicious communication patterns. The novelty
of this visualization tool is that it incorporates node reordering
strategies in MSV. The reordering techniques take account of
closure, proximity, and similarity to ensure outliers stand out
from mass data. Webga and Lu [44] project nodes (i.e., users)
into a circular layout to discover rating frauds from the tem-
poral relationship between users and items. The combination
of singular value decomposition diagram, re-ordered matrix
representation, and the temporal view reveals interesting group
patterns of items. These patterns share a similar rating history
and users of similar behaviors.
D. Interaction Methods
Visual analytics of social interaction behaviors applies track-
ing & monitoring as one of the first steps of exploratory
analysis. TwitInfo [36] tracks bursts of events in time series
by highlighting the event peaks in a line chart. These peaks
suggest events that trigger heated discussion on Twitter. Koven
et al. [28] multi-select summaries of email contents in the
main panel to keep track of important keywords regarding
scamming activities. FluxFlow [32] monitors information dif-
fusion using multiple coordinated views. As analysts select
a point in tree view, the diffusion pattern generated by the
user’s reposting behavior is shown in the thread view. The in-
teraction is usually achieved in tools with multiple coordinated
views [25], [18], [48], [34], [57], [58].
Exploration & navigation allows analysts to focus on dif-
ferent subranges of data flexibly. Végas et al. [54] design a
scrolling bar, allowing analysts to review email conversation
in different periods of time. TargetVue [34] enables analysts
to zoom and pan in global and inspection view to locate to
anomalous areas. Exploration in Episogram [52] is not limited
to zooming function. Analysts can select a user of interest, and
aggregate all users who perform the same posting/reposting
activity. In this way, an individual’s details as well as the
general trend are obtained. MobiVis [48] designs a “behavior
ring”, from which analysts select different levels of granularity
to arrange calling events in a radial form around a node. The
length of petals corresponds to the duration of selected events.
Pattern discovery is achieved in various forms of inter-
action such as filtering. Gloor et al. [50] visualize email
data to discern the structure of networks and identify core
contributors. Emails are presented according to the type of
links (i.e., “To”/“From”/“Cc”) in the email network. Scat-
terBlogs2 [38] supports generation of task-tailored filters in
the classifier creation environment. In the monitoring set-
ting, analysts can orchestrate the filters to detect anomalous
users. Sorting visual objects also uncovers interesting patterns.
Cloudlines [42] visualizes online news events in timelines in
either linear or logarithmic scale. The tool allows analysts
to reconfigure visual objects via click and drag. Webga and
Lu [44] detect rating frauds in the projection view, which
contains two orthogonal axes inside a circle. Analysts can
choose any two dimensions and the mapping method to dig
out the outlier pattern. Changing encoding scheme is useful.
Chae et al. [47] demonstrate events detected from microblog
messages with a heat map, scatters, and hexagons on a map.
TargetVue [34] encodes users’ action in a time sequence,
anomalousness of their behaviors, and correlation to three
glyph designs, so that analysts acquire various perspectives
of the social accounts.
Analysts may want to save results of analysis for future
study. For example, documents of interest can be saved in
the evidence box of the EventRiver [51] visualization tool.
This function supports hypothesis evaluation and evidence
exchange. Koven et al. [28] allow analysts to share tags
created during analysis of email contents. Visualization on a
website tends to have more flexible applications of knowl-
edge externalization than stand-alone tools. After one analyze
the anomalous extent of social bots in the Hoaxy platform
(https://hoaxy.iuni.iu.edu/) [35], the results can be saved into
CSV files for sharing.
Refinement & identification is conducted after analysts have
obtained a basic understanding of social interaction behaviors.
LeadLine [46] associates events with corresponding time-
sensitive keywords automatically. Analysts can then annotate
the events manually to provide accurate labels. There are two
labeling strategies in EventRiver [51]: representative event
labeling and outlier labeling. On one hand, representative
labeling is for events that contribute to the biggest cluster of a
story. On the other hand, outlier labeling labels outlier events
in a story. Koven et al. [28] emphasize tagging abilities in
discoveries of anomalies. Analysts can label an account as
a scammer, victim, service, or other categories. These tags
can be used for creating filters as well as the calculation of
statistics about scamming activities.
V. TRAVEL
Travel is physical movements of users between places
containing geographic information. Analysis of travel behav-
iors is meaningful for traffic monitoring, urban safety, and
urban planning [59]. Travel behavior data can be collected
from mobile phones and base stations, Global Positioning
System (GPS), maritime search and rescue events, and medical
records. Anomalous travel behaviors differ from the expected
patterns indicated by individual historic records or activities of
the crowd. Examples include irregular driving direction [60],
[59], hotspots (e.g., crowded neighborhoods) [59], [61], [62],
and characteristic travel patterns associated with groups of
travelers [20], [63]. These anomalous behaviors can reveal
potentially harmful events such as disease outbreaks and
terrorist attacks.
A. Data Types
Spatiotemporal data is essential to describe the information
of when and where about users’ physical motion. Spatial data
consists of latitudes and longitudes, trajectories, pickup/drop-
off locations, locations of base stations, etc. Temporal data
includes timestamps of indoor activities, estimated time arrival,
and pickup/drop-off date and time. Analysis of travel behavior
usually combines both spatial and temporal data. Pu et al. [64]
explore mobility patterns of different user groups from mobile
phone data collected from each base station and handoff
data (i.e., successive calls with different base station IDs).
Spatiotemporal data related to communication include the start
time of calls, time duration, the city of the opposite side of
calls, and location and direction of base stations. TelCoVis [61]
explores co-occurrence of people using telco data, which is
a type of all-in-one mobile phone data containing activity
records of calls, messages, and Internet usage. Data of each
type of activity is comprised of timestamps, base station ID
and the corresponding latitude and longitude. Kim et al. [65]
create a visualization that helps comprehend flow patterns by
analyzing the spatial distribution of non-directional discrete
events over time.
Multidimensional data enriches skeletons of analysis of
travel behavior. A combination of attributes including distance
traveled, speed of cars, tip amount and toll amount for taxi
trips, and frequency of residents’ indoor activities provides a
detailed description of travelers or vehicles. Pu et al. [64]
aggregate multidimensional data associated with base stations
and mobile phone users. The data includes the total number
of phone calls made by each user at each station and at all
stations, in addition to spatiotemporal details. Malik et al. [66]
evaluate the potential risks of Coast Guard search and rescue
(SAR) operations to better plan response actions to mitigate
risks. The SAR data consists of two components: response
cases and response sorties. Multidimensional data of each
component contains the number of lives saved, lost, and
assisted. Voila [59] extracts multidimensional features to detect
abnormal incoming and outgoing taxi flows in a cell (a region
is segmented into multiple cells). Examples of the features are
the number of vehicles that flow in and out from one cell to
another. Analysis of inflows and outflows for multiple cells
consist of multidimensional data.
Text associated with travel behavior is mainly used for
identification and categorization. Examples include user ID,
textual messages, and roam type and toll type. Pu et al. [64]
collect information of mobile phone ID, International Mobile
Equipment Identity, city ID, roam city, roam type, and toll
type to describe properties of mobile phones. These details
help explain the nature of mobile phone users, i.e., travelers.
Beecham et al. [63] categorize people into different groups
in order to summarize group-cycling behaviors. Cyclists under
the cycle hire scheme are classified according to age, sex,
full postcode, whether they cycle more with others or on
an individual basis, and spatiotemporal information. Liao
et al. [67] study resident indoor activities. These activities
include not only long-term activities such as sleep, relax, watch
TV, but also short-term ones such as entering home.
Network data refers to trajectories between origins and
destinations. Network data is mainly used to complement
spatiotemporal analysis. Ko et al. [68] assess flight journeys
that often delay by analyzing pairs of origin and destination
airports. By aggregating the amount of delays for each flight
journey (i.e., network), analysts detect anomalous airports
and flights where prevalent delays are often found. Beecham
et al. [63] study group-cycle journeys that link starting points
and destinations.
B. Anomaly Detection Techniques
Statistical anomaly detection technique is the most often
used to analyze travel behaviors. A data-driven approach [70]
using self-organizing maps and Gaussian mixture models
are applied to describing normal behaviors of vessels. By
comparing data with rules and signatures, unusual traveling
patterns are detected through visual analytics. A box-plot
method [56] checks whether geographical regularity deviates
from normal conditions by large extents. Two visualization
works [71], [69] apply cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithms
after kernel density estimation to better identify outliers in
time series. One [71] calculates density estimation for the
event category as well as density estimation for all categories,
and obtain the expected number of events within a given
area. Outbreaks in the temporal domain can be detected with
the cumulative summation algorithm for the given location.
Applying CUSUM after kernel density estimation enables
analysts to spot spatial areas worth investigation quickly, and
then analyze historical time series to look for unusual trends.
The other work [69] also utilizes CUSUM algorithm to trace
uncommon development patterns.
Clustering-based is employed to reduce computation com-
plexity and visual clutter for large-scale databases. Andrienko
et al. [72] use k-means clustering to analyze spatiotemporal
phenomena described by multiple spatial time series. The
clustering approach groups spatial objects by the similarity
of their corresponding time series, and thus spatially unusual
events can be detected. The clustering approach is used in
conjunction with statistical methods to model time series
such that residuals are randomly distributed over time. High
deviations from expected time values are seen as anomalies.
K-means clustering is also used to detect anomalies of mo-
bility patterns around base stations [64] and group-cycling
behavior [63]. This clustering approach requires the number
of output clusters to be specified before computation. Lin
et al. [73] propose VizTree and Diff-Tree to mine anomalous
patterns by comparing time series (e.g., yoga postures) with
normal references. It uses bottom-up hierarchical clustering
to produce a nested hierarchy of similar groups of objects
based on a pairwise distance matrix. TelCoVis [61] applies
a biclustering technique in binary matrices, where 1 means
co-occurs of human mobility and 0 means otherwise. Thus,
origins and destinations of human mobility can be bundled
into coordinated sets as biclusters.
Nearest neighbor-based anomaly detection techniques com-
pute the continuous distribution for detection and anomaly
scores. KDE computes the spatial and/or temporal distribution
of discrete events, which is particularly useful for detecting
hotspots in density-based visualizations. Malik et al. [66]
employs a modified variable KDE technique to identify spatial
hotspots of search and rescue cases in the U.S. Coast Guard.
Kim et al. [65] compute continuous spatiotemporal distribu-
tions of discrete events by applying the KDE approach to two-
dimensional data, which is achieved without trajectory infor-
mation. Local outlier factor (LOF), a density-based nearest
neighbor-based technique is used to calculate anomaly degree
of indoor daily activities of residents. Duration, number of
times, and start time are selected as the properties to compute
outliers.
C. Visualization Techniques
Egocentric Behaviors. Egocentric Travel Behavior is indi-
vidual physical movement in geographic space. An example
of anomalies associated with egocentric travel behavior is an
unexpected increase in time spent on indoor activities. Chart
visualization is seen to represent egocentric travel behaviors.
VizTree [73] uses suffix tree visualization to indicate ab-
normal parts of the time series by comparing with reference
(i.e., normal) patterns. Anomaly detection is achieved by
transforming a time series into a symbolic representation and
visualizing it as a modified suffix tree. Weaver et al. [20]
explore individual hotel visitors in a calendar view, a map
view, and an arc diagram. A calendar view shows total visits
on each day, with squares and circles indicating weekends
and weekdays, respectively. A multi-layer map view describes
paths from residences to hotels, relative to railroads and rivers.
By synthesizing temporal and spatial patterns observed from
multiple views, analysts obtain circuitous routes taken by
salesmen, cooperation between traveling merchants, and the
effects of weather and seasonal variations, etc. Liao et al. [67]
are interested in resident behaviors recorded by smart home
visual systems. A heat Gantt chart view shows start time,
duration, and the number of occurrence of different activities
on a daily basis. By combining the heat Gantt chart with other
views, activities that deviate from daily routines are detected
through comparison on different daily records.
Geographic visualization is also seen for egocentric travel
behaviors. A transit map displays GPS traces [60] of moving
taxis in basic mode, monitoring mode, and tagging mode.
Taxis are represented by glyphs on the map, with the colors
dependent on whether the taxi is loaded with passengers. A
taxi with an irregular driving direction or moving at high
speed, and a crowded neighborhood are egocentric anomalous
travel behaviors.
Collective Behaviors. A collection of users move together
in time and space, we say their travel behaviors are collective.
Abnormal travel behaviors can be identified from regions
crowded with people. As most visualization tools studying
collective travel behaviors employ geographic visualization,
we analyze travel behaviors using the finer categories under
geographic visualization including flow maps, heat maps, and
bubble/dot map.
Flow maps represent trajectories by linking origins and des-
tinations on a map. Andrienko [72] proposes a framework for
spatiotemporal analysis and modeling. Anomalies are found in
temporal line charts displaying model residuals. Spatial flows
between cells are represented by directed half-arrows whose
widths are proportional to the total counts of objects that
move. The flows are laid upon Voronoi maps. Trajectories of
cycling patterns are shown as flows on a London city map [63].
Fig. 4. Visualizations of anomalous travel behaviors. (a) Kim et al. [65] show origin and destination via directions of arrows in a flow map. (b) Ferreira
et al. [62] investigate anomalous taxi trips in New York city in multiple coordinated views of a dot map and a line chart. (c) Voila [59] displays unusual
traffic flows between a focal region using heap map. (d) Von et al. [69] visualize different types spatiotemporal patterns by parallel coordinates. (e) Wu
et al. [61] design a contour-based treemap to illustrate spatial and temporal characteristics of human mobility at a specific place.
The straight and curved end of a flow represent origin and
destination, respectively. Group journeys are colored red on
the map whereas non-group journeys are colored blue. One
of the findings is that female cyclists are more likely to
make late evening journeys when cycling in groups. Kim
et al. [65] (Figure 4 (a)) extract, represent, and analyze flow
maps and heat maps of spatiotemporal data without the use
of trajectory information. The flow map visualizes origin and
destination via directions of arrows, and the difference of flows
are encoded in heat maps. Hot spots can be found with this
visualization.
Heat maps display spatial densities of collective travel
behaviors. Maciejewski et al. [71] develop an interactive
visual environment to dig out hot spots in spatiotemporal data
for crime analysis or surveillance syndrome. Bivariate and
multivariate heat maps help detect spatiotemporal hot spots by
combining height maps, colors, and contours. To analyze risks
of Coast Guard search and rescue (SAR), Malik et al. [66]
identify potential hot spots using heat maps. Risks of stations
are indicated by the intensity of colors. The red heat map
shows the time taken by stations to deploy an asset to an SAR
accident while the green heat map indicates the SAR coverage.
Ferreira et al. [62] (Figure 4 (b)) investigate anomalous taxi
trips in New York city in multiple coordinated views of a dot
map and chart visualizations. Dots on a map imply pickup and
dropoff sites in the region. In the cases of Hurricane Sandy
and Irene, there are virtually no dots during hurricanes, but
traffic seemed to go back to normal in the following days.
Voila [59] (Figure 4 (c)) explores taxi trips to detect sudden
changes in traffic patterns. There is an anomaly detection
mode giving visual cues of regional anomalies, and a context
mode providing information of volume difference, traffic flow,
and expected patterns at different times. Unusual traffic flows
between a focal region and two other places are highlighted
by the deep red color of heat maps. Feedback from analysts
can update the anomaly score and thus change the color of
heat maps for the selected region.
We analyze other visualization techniques for travel be-
haviors including sequence and graph visualization. Von
et al. [69] (Figure 4 (d)) categorize spatiotemporal patterns
into different types of locations according to home, work,
tennis, etc. The main view is Dynamic Categorical Data View
in a varied form of parallel coordinates, which show the
evolution of all types of data. Each axis of parallel coordinates
indicates a point in time. When analysts select a type of
data, related geographic information is plotted in the linked
map, where arrows on the map indicate physical movement
of people. In TelCoVis [61], Wu et al. design a contour-based
treemap to illustrate the spatial and temporal characteristics
of human mobility. By combining with heat map, matrix, and
parallel coordinates, analysts gain insights into co-occurrence
of human mobility and correlations of co-occurrence.
D. Interaction Methods
Analysts track and monitor data to look for anomalies.
Uninteresting and expected patterns can be unmarked [73].
This improves the efficiency of detection processes and re-
duces false positives. TelCoVis [61] emphasizes the correlation
between spatial and temporal data for exploring the co-
occurrence of human mobility. When analysts hover on a
sector in the contour-based treemap, all sectors corresponding
to the same region will be highlighted. Moreover, analysts can
mark the region for exploration. Analysts can track a set of
features of categoric data [69] including location, movement
pattern, group membership, and group changes. The selected
data instances are highlighted in the linked map view and the
categoric view.
The interactions associated with exploration & navigation
piece separate fragments of data. Panning and altering views
via scrollbars facilitate detection of non-trivial patterns in large
time series databases [73]. High-level outlooks and details
should be accessed interchangeably when exploring travel
behaviors. Different levels of aggregation in time [66], [62],
[72] and space [62], [68], [59], [63] are seen in a variety of
visualization tools.
Unusual travel patterns are uncovered by filtering, config-
uration, and encoding to various visual forms. The anomaly
grading view in SHVis [67] present anomaly scores of selected
activities. Analysts click on different days and drag date
intervals to compare the activities during the different periods
of time. In order to analyze maritime operations and assess
risks associated with the allocation of resources [66], analysts
generate a combination of filters which can be applied to
spatial regions and temporal plots. In addition, analysts can
evaluate the effects as a result of opening/closing a station, and
determine which station is suited for closing. Visualization can
be altered in color and in form to reveal anomalous patterns.
Andrienko [72] builds a framework for spatiotemporal analy-
sis. A rich set of interactive exploration is embedded. Analysts
can change the color scheme and assign colors to clusters on
maps and line charts. Analysts can choose the parameters to
be mapped in the parallel coordinates, and adjust smoothing
parameters as well as the time period for the contour-based
treemap in TelCoVis [61].
Externalization of results records analysts of important
discoveries. Voila [59] includes a snapshot panel for analysts
to conveniently capture the overall and detailed map views.
Ferreira et al. [62] explore taxi trips using TaxiVis, which
supports exporting query results in CSV files, the same type of
files as their input source. The visual analytics framework [72]
models spatiotemporal data. The model description files can
be stored externally along with group membership of place,
statistical details.
As analysts gradually develop basic knowledge, they rec-
ognize suspicious areas and integrate domain knowledge in
anomaly detection. After a link is described as anomalous, the
link is placed on the top of visualization while the other links
become transparent [68]. In Voila [59], analysts incorporate
their judgments about whether the region is anomalous. This
feedback is taken into consideration in the recalculation of
anomaly scores of all regions in the space.
VI. NETWORK COMMUNICATION
Network communication is sending and receiving informa-
tion between machines via networks. Examination of net-
work communication has practical significance for national
defense [74] and commercial enterprises [75]. Network com-
munication behaviors include routing, network traffic, and
port activities, etc. Anomaly detection associated with net-
work communication is usually concerned with cyber security,
which is protecting computers and systems against malicious
activities in a computer-related system. Anomalies are indi-
cated by alarms and suspicious patterns that deviate from
expectation. Investigation into these signals reveal attacks such
as BGP routing instability [76], [77], virus outbreak [78], port
scans [79], [80], [81], and intrusion into systems [82], [83].
A. Data Types
The identified connection between sources and destinations
is seen as network data. Network data is important for detect-
ing anomalous network communication, as it is the foundation
for analyzing information exchange between machines. For
example, the network connection between autonomous do-
mains (ASes) [84] and that between subnets and hosts [85] can
be analyzed. VisFlowConnect [78] focuses on network traffic
between an internal domain sender and an internal/external
domain receiver. Liao et al. [75] represent enterprise net-
works consisting of hosts, users, and applications as host-user-
application connectivity graphs. From the graphs, the similar-
ity of users by applications can be assessed. VisAlert [86],
[74] considers large-scale attack patterns between alerts and
local networks. Analysts can obtain an overview of intrusion
attempts and general situations by inspecting networks formed
by alerts and a topology map of local network nodes.
Multidimensional data contains multiple numeric attributes
to describe context information in network communication.
Attack frequency, flow rates (i.e., number of packets and bytes
for a fixed period), and system load are examples of mul-
tidimensional data when discussing network communication
behavior. Teoh et al. [76] uses intensity, categorical, and
counting measures to describe routing behaviors. Each mea-
sure has its corresponding degree of abnormality. The anomaly
threshold is calculated from the anomaly degrees of multiple
measures. SpiralView [87] presents a connection as a list of
events introduced in terms of time, source host, application,
and destination host. The details of connection are described
using multidimensional data, which are incorporated in the
description of alarms. MVSec [80] uses multidimensional data
including the number of connections, flow counts, and flow
bytes. The statistics are combined with temporal features to
explain each unit of network security data.
Spatiotemporal data of network communication associates
mainly with addresses of receivers and/or senders, and tem-
poral information of occurred activities. Spatiotemporal data
provides details of timestamps and IP addresses. Investiga-
tion of spatiotemporal data is helpful for traffic monitoring,
as can be seen in [88] which deals with timestamps from
millisecond to year together with IP addresses from IP prefix
to continents. Erbahcer et al. [21] explore time and difference
in IP addresses between the external domain and that of
the monitored system. The greater the differences between
addresses, the more suspicious the network communication
is. SpiralView [87] is interested in how alarms evolve in time
with the purpose of detecting periodic patterns. By inspecting
alarms of the same level of attack severity, alarms can be
segmented based on their temporal distribution to better under-
stand network behaviors. VisTracer [77] visualizes destination
ASes of traceroutes against time to assess spatiotemporal
patterns of occurred anomalies.
Text data type provides low-level details about connections
in cyber networks. Text data can be encoded to visualization
for high-level exploration, or acts as evidence for confirmation
of hypothesis regarding anomalousness. Text data includes tex-
tual logs and categories of events. Erbacher et al. [21] repre-
sent textual log information using glyphs. Textual logs contain
time, locations and, types of connection. Teoh et al. [82]
project connections with known classes (i.e., normal, probe,
DOS, U2R, and R2L) into regions in a visualization panel.
Suspicious data is found separate from normal data, facilitating
further investigation.
B. Anomaly Detection Techniques
Statistical anomaly detection techniques are widely used in
the detection of abnormal network communication. Detection
techniques of cyber attacks are categorized into signature-
based (matching suspicious behaviors with known attack
patterns based on existing statistical models or rules) and
anomaly-based (comparing behaviors against a “normal” base-
line) [10], both of which can be described using statistical
methods.
We describe visualization works that incorporate statistical
methods below. Teoh et al. [76] investigate BGP routing
instability with a signature-based detection and a statistics-
based algorithm. Signatures based on bursts of sequence within
a time window are matched with data. The statistics-based
approach raises an alarm when current behaviors deviate
from expected patterns obtained from history. VIAssist [90]
highlights data instances that meet the criteria of attacks
seen in the catalog and discovers the unexpected patterns
by interactive exploration of visualization. Mansmann [88]
applies a signature-based algorithm to detecting botnet spread
propagation whereas significant traffic changes are visual-
ized in a readily noticeable form. VisTracer [91], [77] com-
pares anomalies with existing scenarios of BGP hijacking.
Unknown suspicious attacks are found by adapting online
change-point detection algorithm and comparing path similar-
ity. MVSec [80] uncovers overall network state details by visu-
alizing several statistical time series including network traffic
and the number of distinct active IPs over time. Suspicious
patterns are analyzed in terms of what, when, and where from
statistics (e.g., time interval, flow counts, flow bytes). Tao
et al. [89] detect point anomalies with a Gaussian model-
based technique for labeled data, and with a histogram-based
technique for unlabeled data. The correlation analysis and
propagation of anomaly score is performed to detect collective
anomalies.
Classification-based methods are used in intrusion detec-
tion [82], [87]. Teoh et al. [82] utilize a user-directed drawing
program, PaintingClass, to classify each object and predict the
categories. Unsupervised attacks are found by comparing posi-
tions of normal instances and unlabeled data. SpiralView [87]
models user behaviors using Bayesian networks, and raises
anomalies for deviations from usual behaviors.
Nearest neighbor-based techniques based on similarity is
applied in [75], which transforms relations among hosts, users,
and applications into network connectivity graphs, bipartite
graphs, multidimensional scaling, and similarity graphs. The
inter-graph similarity is evaluated in a top-down manner, and
node similarity is analyzed based on the dynamics of node
degrees. LongLine [92] uses local outlier factor to facilitate
the comparison of temporal patterns of anomalous systems
behaviors. The tool employs a frequency-based model which
identifies files and addresses in audit logs as an individual
entity. The entity is described by a feature vector constructed
from their extended bag of system call models.
TVi [93] uses a spectral technique to direct users to time
periods of anomalous activities. The tool derives a scalable
metric (entropy from IP addresses and ports) and conducts di-
mension reduction using principle component analysis (PCA).
NStreamAware [83] applies a DBSCAN algorithm to cluster
timelines, which achieves event detection in streaming data.
The possibly important temporal segments are further assessed
by analysts through interactive exploration.
C. Visualization Techniques
Egocentric Behaviors. An egocentric network communi-
cation behavior triggers alarms due to suspicious network
properties of the connection between source host(s) and des-
tination host(s). Examples of egocentric anomalous network
communication behaviors are hijacking network traces by
another AS, a port scan, and unusually high volume of traffic
on a machine. Glyph and graph visualizations are used to
represent egocentric behaviors.
Erbacher et al. [21] initiated one of the earliest visual-
izations to display IP addresses of alarms in a glyph-based
radial form. Line glyphs surrounding a central node represent
different types of connection (e.g., parallel lines indicate initial
connection requests). The difference in IP addresses between
the external domain and that of the monitored system is
encoded in the length of line glyphs. The suspicious connec-
tion is colored red due to unexpected user activity such as
timeouts expire. Teoh et al. [76] inquire into Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) routing instability. Near-real-time monitoring
of Internet routing is pictured as temporal line charts and
glyphs, where a suspicious event detected from statistics is
illustrated with a large circle in high position and a spike in
timeline.
Graph visualization, especially matrix is used to de-
tect anomalous egocentric network communication. Goodall
et al. [81] develop a matrix showing network activity of hosts
over time. Communication between hosts is superimposed on
the matrix, complemented by multiple linked views detailing
port activity and raw packets. NVisionIP [85] detects traces
of abnormal network behaviors in multiple levels of an entire
Fig. 5. Visualizations of anomalous network communication behaviors. (a) VisTracer [77] visualizes routing anomalies in traceroutes using matrix. (b)
Tao et al. [89] design a high-order correlation graph to show collective anomalies. (c) MVSec [80] mines correlation of events attributed by what, when and
where in a dandelion-metaphor using circular-based design. (d) SpiralView [87] analyzes how alarms evolve in time and detect suspicious patterns using a
radar chart.
class-B IP network. NVisionIP consists of a galaxy view in
matrix, a small multiples view, and a machine view with bar
chart. Spikes in traffic volume are seen as changes in node
colors in the matrix. Simple scanning attacks are discovered
as clusters in the matrix, where x- and y-axis stand for
subnets and hosts, respectively. VisTracer [77] (Figure 5 (a))
tackles large trace route data sets to distinguish legitimate
routing changes and spam campaigns. Time and destination
of ASes are represented by x- and y-axis in a matrix layout.
Rectangular glyphs in the matrix layout are anomalies. Two
nearly identical anomaly patterns at the same x-position in the
matrix indicate routing anomalies in two ASes.
Collective Behaviors. Collective network communication
behaviors involve more than one exchange of information be-
tween two machines or among multiple machines. Anomalous
behaviors include botnet infection and periodic attacks, which
are represented in graph and sequence visualizations.
Tree visualization, one of the graph visualization, helps
identify anomalous network communication behaviors. Teoh
et al. [84] examine routing behavior of BGP data. Each IP
address is mapped to one pixel in a quadtree visualization
to detect anomalous origin AS changes. An event is repre-
sented by a line connecting the affected IP prefix and ASes.
Anomalies are revealed as an area concentrated in lines, since
events that take similar paths multiple times are suspicious.
Teoh et al. [82] detect intruders by allowing analysts to
interactively explore activity logs in an interactive decision
tree visualization layout. Complementary to this view, a three-
dimensional scatter diagram pinpoints unlabeled anomalies
when a high-density cluster lies in areas of sparse training data.
Mansmann et al. [88] aggregate IP addresses according to
prefix, autonomous system, country and continent in treemaps
based on two layout algorithms. This visualization helps
monitor large-scale network data. Segments in treemaps are
colored indicating sharp changes in the number of incoming
connections.
Node-link diagrams visualize structures of collective net-
work communication. Tao et al. [89] (Figure 5 (b)) design
a high-order correlation graph to show collective anomalies.
When applied to software analysis, malicious attacks due to
software vulnerabilities are identified as collective anomalies.
In this case, a node illustrates each line of code, an event
represents an execution, and a correlation link represents data
flow. NIVA [94], [95] coordinate 3D node-link view with
glyph design and circular histograms. It distinguishes from
other visualizations as it builds attack severity into interaction
inspired by the “haptic” concept. For example, when dragging
nodes in the three-dimensional view, users can feel the force
of “push” and “pull” motion computed based upon attack
frequency.
Circular-based visualization is also used to demonstrate col-
lective network communication behaviors. VisAlert [86], [74]
identifies critical attacks of hosts through analyzing “what,
when, where” information of alerts. The alerts are allocated on
segments of rings according to the severity of attacks. “When”
attribute is mapped such that the innermost ring represents
the most recent activities. Inside the ring, a network topology
map is used to depict network under scrutiny. FloVis [79]
observes interactions between host pairs on either side of
the monitored border. A bundle diagram displays connections
between entities in a radial tree layout. Scanning activities
can be detected by examining bundles directed from 9000
consecutively numbered ports to the internal host. MVSec [80]
presents four coordinated views to discover anomalies and
retrieve stories behind subtle events. The event radar view
(Figure 5 (c)) mines correlation of events attributed by what,
when and where in a dandelion-metaphor in a ring. Seeds
(i.e., subnets) spread from the center of the dandelion stalk,
which represents the only entrance to the network. Antennas
(i.e., hosts) extend from the seed, giving a two-layer hierarchi-
cal structure. The seriousness of botnet infection, for instance,
is indicated by the number of colored nodes in the dandelion-
metaphor.
Sequence visualization uncover abnormal trends of collec-
tive network communication. While NVisionIP [85] focuses
on activities occurred on machines, its complementary tool
VisFlowConnect [78] explores network flows between ma-
chines using parallel coordinates. VisFlowConnect investigates
the relationship between senders and receivers. A cluster of
lines originating from an external host sender indicates a virus
outbreak. SpiralView [87] (Figure 5 (d)) analyzes how alarms
evolve in time and detect suspicious patterns (e.g., alarms
appearing everyday at the same time). The alarms are scattered
dots in a radar chart, which is useful for identifying periodic
patterns of intrusions. The alarms are arranged from the
center to the outer part so that recent events are allocated
with more space. NStreamAware [83] analyzes a condensed
heterogeneous data stream and uses a sliding slice to provide
a summary for the selected period of time. The tool supports
omitting and merging normal ranges so that suspicious port
activities, attack patterns, and routing behaviors are revealed.
D. Interaction Methods
Detection of anomalous network communication requires
tracking & monitoring. Teoh et al. [76] direct analysts’
attention to anomalies by highlighting the background gray.
In the TVi [93] visual querying system, analysts select an
item in the anomaly list, and then the associated time range is
highlighted in the timeline visualization. In NVisAware [83],
analysts can click the star icon to store the real-time sliding
slice under investigation. The events marked with star icons
are added to the same view. Analysts can determine suspicious
patterns from flagged and labeled events from the starred
time slices. There are four coordinated views in MVSec [80].
Interaction in one view is linked to visualization in another
view, which is helpful for digging hidden network attacks that
are hard to recognize.
Interesting network communication behaviors are found by
exploring visual elements in the same scale or in multiple
levels of granularity. VisAlert [86], [74] enables panning and
zooming operations of the topology map in the ring. Analysts
can also configure projections onto rings by collapsing and
expanding alert grouping on rings. Tao et al. [89] employs
the direct-walk technique (i.e., a series of mouse clicks) for ex-
ploring anomalies. When an analyst notices a suspicious node,
he/she clicks another node that contributes to the anomaly
of the suspicious node. That is, the analyst extends examines
effects on the node due to more nodes. Mansmann et al. [96],
[88] aggregate IP addresses according to prefix, autonomous
system, country and continent in treemaps. Drill-down and
roll-up functions can be applied for nodes of the same level
of detail.
Interactive methods are used to unveil suspicious patterns
of data. The filter dialogue in NVisionIP [85] restricts what
data flows to be visualized. Analysts visualize network traffic
according to the filters based upon the combination of IP
address, ports, protocols, and display type. The visual analytics
tool FloVis [79] has a bundle diagram that describes network
flows between a source and a destination. Analysts can loosen
the bundles to find suspicious attack patterns. Additionally,
analysts can choose to linearly distort points on the circle
of the bundle diagram. Mansmann et al. [96], [88] color
data in treemaps in a linear or logarithmic scale. Coloring in
the logarithmic scale makes the visualization resistant to the
randomness of data. Teoh et al. [82] use a painting program
to help categorize the same type of anomalies into one group.
Analysts interactively arrange data instances through drawing,
partition, and appropriate coloring.
Analysts may keep a record of results for further analysis.
The intrusion detection tool NIVA [95] allows analysts to ex-
port results in an ASCII format. VIAssist [90] is designed for
collaborative working environments. The report builder in the
visualization tool allows analysts to drag and drop graphical
objects in the current display. The results with annotations can
then be saved as PowerPoint or PDF file. MVSec [80] simplify
analysts’ operation by offering frequently-used configuration
files for anomaly detection. Analysts can export their config-
urations as a new configuration file.
VIAssist [90] has an expression builder and E-Diary to ful-
fill the refinement & identification task. Analysts can formulate
a hypothesis about a suspicious activity into an expression.
A catalog of expressions collects knowledge, i.e., hypotheses
made by analysts during analysis. The E-Diary helps docu-
mentation of hypotheses. This encourages sharing annotations
with colleagues and communication of hypotheses in a group.
Analysts can annotate suspicious patterns in SpiralView [87]
for long-term analysis and policy’s assessment. The annota-
tions can be an explanation for the anomalies and the action
applied to the system.
VII. TRANSACTION
Transaction refers to monetary flows in buying and selling.
The goal is to connect financial sources to companies or
individuals. In a broad sense, stock market deals [97], credit
card transactions [98], business processes [99], [100] are under
this category. Frauds are the typical type of anomalies associ-
ated with transactions, as people may be allured by monetary
benefits to perform illegal transactions. Clients may collude
with employees in financial institutes in activities of money
laundering, unauthorized transactions, and embezzlement, etc.
[101]. Other anomalies include unexpected business processes
[102], [100] and high default group in a network of guaranteed
loans [103].
A. Data Types
Spatiotemporal data describes details of location, times-
tamps of transaction, and time series of events. Spatioemporal
analysis is critical in financial analysis, and thus detection
of anomalous transactions often incorporates analysis of geo-
graphic locations and time series. Attributes including time
of transaction [100], [98], how often a customer executes
operations [104] and geographic regions [105], [101] provide
a foundation for first-step analysis. For example, the Event
Tunnel [100] conducts temporal correlation to link seemingly
isolated events, and thus business patterns and fraud patterns
involving more than one individual [97] can be uncovered.
Huang et al. [97] perform spatial correlation in addition
to temporal and spectral (based on frequency) to identify
suspected traders and attack plans.
Multidimensional data is often used in conjunction with spa-
tiotemporal data to detect anomalous transactions. By probing
into time series along with details of the amount of money
transferred [101], [98], [105], the number of transactions
within a period of time [99], [105], and number of the activities
that are new to the user [106], analysts can gain an overall
picture of the histories of financial transactions. An example
of using multidimensional and spatiotemporal information is
VisImpact [105]. VisImpact correlates variables of purchase
quarter (i.e., temporal details), fraud amount, and fraud count
to reveal relationships among important factors. Legg [106]
identifies insider threats in an organization by inspecting
multidimensional data including the number of times that the
user performs particular tasks, number of these activities that
are new to this user and to any user in this same position.
Network data describes relationships among entities in-
volved in transactions. A network can be links between
traders [97] in trading networks, between entities such as
people, companies, and banks [107], and between enterprises
that take loan guarantee [103]. For example, Niu et al. [103]
consider high default groups as communities in networks.
A community that interacts with each other internally more
frequently than those outside of it can trigger serious financial
losses. Didimo et al. [107] analyze categorical networks that
contain different types of entities to discover financial crimes.
Indices such as the centrality of a node, like betweenness, and
node degree are measured to indicate anomalousness.
When analyzing transaction behavior, categories derived
from text help describe the relationship between a payer
and a payee [108], [109], label different types of activities
conducted by employees [106], and identify the type of state
changes in a business process [100]. Text data is used to
distinguish between senders, intermediates, and receivers in
financial transactions, and to build profiles for analyzing their
potential suspicious behaviors. For example, WireVis [108],
[109] extracts pre-defined keywords from a set of transactions
and relates the keywords that appear in the same transaction.
Keyword-to-account relationship is analyzed based on the
number of time the keywords appear in that transaction. Jigsaw
[110] help identify any linkages between people or companies
relevant to financial frauds such as fictitious suppliers’ invoices
and systematic deletion of suppliers’ invoices. These linkages
are found by keyword/sentence summaries of transactions,
sentiment, and word clouds of a document.
B. Anomaly Detection Techniques
Statistical methods applied to the detection of suspicious
transactions build normal profiles of customers, and then eval-
uate new transactions against known anomalies in historical
data. Huang et al. [97] match suspected patterns in spatial,
temporal, and spectral (i.e., frequency) domains with similar
patterns seen in historical databases, which act as anomalous
signatures. Leite et al. [104] first build customer profiles
from their frequency, amount, and location of transfer from
histories. New transactions are then evaluated against the
profiles to see if they are anomalous. The visualization tool
EVA [101] generates customer profiles and provides differ-
ent statistical measures for new transactions. The statistical
profiles combine histograms and rules specified by experts to
provide references. Sudden behavior changes in comparison
to the profiles are identified as suspicious. Anomalies are
highlighted if anomaly scores exceed a threshold.
Application of clustering-based techniques is based on the
assumption that anomalous financial communities share com-
mon features within a group. WireVis [108], [109] implements
the k-d tree algorithm to detect suspicious behaviors in wire
transactions. It treats accounts as points in k-dimensional
space, where k is the number of attributes. The accounts are
grouped using a centroid-based clustering technique. Schaefer
et al. [112] cluster entries based on similarity of temporal
event patterns so that analysts can identify suspicious patterns
in a packed visualization. An event pattern refers to an event
sequence or event episode that displays interesting properties.
Didimo et al. [107] apply hierarchical clustering by finding
k-cores in a graph, which is effective for discovering relevant
groups in networks. This graph-based clustering defines clus-
ters of cohesive structures, in which each cluster has at least k
inter-connected neighboring points. Clustering based on graph
structure is used in Network Explorer [113]. Communities in
the financial network can be identified as clusters converted
from undifferentiated nodes and edges. Two clustering algo-
rithms are employed to process large-scale networks on the
server side and process smaller networks on the client side.
Classification-based, nearest neighbor-based, information
theoretic, and spectral techniques are discussed below. Ol-
szewski [98] uses a threshold-type binary classification tech-
nique to determine whether an account in self-organizing maps
(SOM) is fraudulent or not. The threshold is computed by
measuring dissimilarity between the centroid of SOM grid and
the maximal value in the matrix. Accounts with values higher
than the threshold are anomalous. A decision tree [111] is
generated from the patterns suggested by auditors. To detect
internal frauds conducted by employees, each employee is
assigned an anomaly value. The value indicating the severity
of anomalousness is obtained by evaluating event series of an
employee against fraud patterns. Structured networks reveal
anomalies. Two risk indices [114] based on neighborhood
structure, i.e., pattern centrality and transaction pattern central-
ity, are computed by assigning weights to each edge that corre-
sponds to a taxpayer in a transaction network. Niu et al. [103]
Fig. 6. Visualizations of anomalous transaction behaviors. (a) Argyriou et al. [111] use a multi-layer radial drawing to describe activities between employees
and clients. (b) Niu et al. [103] assess risk of guaranteed loans by visualizing networks of small and medium enterprises groups using a node-link visualization.
(c) Leite et al. [101] design user-friendly views of chart visualizations and parallel coordinates to help identify anomalous transactions.
employ an information theoretic-based approach to uncover
risk guarantee pattern and detect high default groups for loans
risk management. Specifically, the proxy for information flow
is the probability flow of random walks in directed weighted
networks. PCA is utilized for identifying insider threat [106]
due to its effectiveness in detecting users that exhibit irregular
variances across the set of derived features. An interactive
PCA helps comprehend relationships between the PCA space
and the original higher-dimensional space in a visual interface.
C. Visualization Techniques
Egocentric Behaviors. An egocentric transaction is de-
scribed as buying or selling behaviors conducted by an
individual. An anomalous egocentric transaction can be an
unauthorized transaction or a deal with an exceptionally high
amount of value. Detection of these behaviors mainly uses
sequence visualization.
VisImpact [99], [105] organizes attributes of transactions by
allocating them onto three parts/axes of a ring: left semicircle,
bisector, and right semicircle. Each axis stands for an attribute
of interest (e.g., region, client, fraud amount, fraud count).
Suntinger et al. [100] display events as nodes in a cylindrical
tunnel. The top view of the cylinder represents historical
events, which are laid out such that more recent events are
in the outer ring. Details of events are encoded by the color
and size of glyphs of the Event Tunnel. Anomalous betting
behaviors of a user are discovered by temporally correlating
the account history events of the user to known suspicious
account profiles. Argyriou et al. [115] study the temporal
relationship of transactions between a pair of client and
employee in a radar chart. The nodes in the radar chart repre-
sent transactions, which are positioned according to the time
of action, pre-defined periodicity, and ordering of timelines.
Events/transactions related to the same client along the radius
of the radar chart are considered suspicious, as the patterns
suggest the employee falsifies the client’s invoices.
Graph and text visualizations are also used to demon-
strate suspicious egocentric transaction behaviors. Argyriou
et al. [111] (Figure 6 (a)) use a multi-layer radial drawing
to describe activities between employees and clients. Each
layer represents a pattern that is suspicious in different aspects
(e.g., actions, systems, periodicity), with heat maps in the side
view measure anomalousness. When an employee is found
to perform events that share similarity with fraud patterns,
a suspicious egocentric behavior is identified. Jigsaw [110]
mines relationships between entities in text documents. The
parallel coordinates view reveals the correlation of selected
attributes (e.g., company, person). By combining with the
heat map for sentiment/similarity analysis, cluster view for
grouping similar documents, and document view for details,
anomalous behaviors can be detected from unique text entities.
Following that work, Kang et al. [116] studies applications of
Jigsaw in various situations including financial transaction. An
employee’s egocentric behavior of creating fictitious supplier
invoices was discovered.
Collective Behaviors. A collective transaction behavior in-
volves several parties in transaction and businesses. Collective
transaction behaviors include a series of wire transfer and
periodic transaction. Graph visualizations are popular among
research works interested in transaction behaviors.
Graph visualization is popular for uncovering collective
transaction anomalies. Huang et al. [97] develop two stages to
inspect stock market security. Firstly, market performance is
evaluated using three-dimensional treemaps, with the heights
of blocks indicating the current price of stocks. Secondly,
trading networks are compared against suspicious patterns in
the historical database. Structured networks are regarded as
collective anomalies in transactions. Several visual analytics
tools [107], [114], [103], [113] develop categoric node-link
visualizations where analysts can merge, split, define new
subgraph structure, cluster nodes by top-down or bottom-up
paradigm, and adjust node sizes by a chosen measurement.
Users edit networks interactively to discover communities,
which are signals for suspicious financial transactions. Didimo
et al. [107] detect financial activity networks such as money
laundering by illustrating entities involved in transactions with
nodes. The entities include banks, companies, persons, bank
accounts, transactions, and reports filing. Edges between nodes
represent semantic connections. For instance, two disjoint
clusters that indicate fraudulent patterns are revealed after
clustering. The level of depth of a cluster reflects the extent of
criticism of the illegal activity. Niu et al. [103] (Figure 6 (b))
assess the risk of guaranteed loans by visualizing networks
of small and medium enterprises groups which back each
other to enhance the financial security. Anomalies, i.e., high
default groups, are identified as communities in the network
using a node-link visualization. A complementary treemap
supports navigation of labels/categories and presentation of
default rates.
Chart and sequence visualizations are also used to detect
collective transaction behaviors. WireVis [108], [109] uses
multiple coordinated chart visualization to analyze suspicious
wire transfers between a payer to a payee via a chain of
intermediaries. The overall trends of activities and individual
transactions are represented by strings and beads in an x-y plot
of transaction value against time. Suspicious transactions are
the ones relevant to a keyword that is only found in the second
half of the year, and a transaction of much higher value than
others. Leite et al. [101] (Figure 6 (c)) design user-friendly
views of chart visualizations and parallel coordinates to help
identify the anomalous connection between the amount and
the suspicious transactions. If anomaly scores of transactions
deviate from normal ranges, the days that contain at least one
suspicious transaction are highlighted in red.
D. Interaction Methods
Analysts track suspicious data by highlighting and cor-
relating relevant data. The visual analytics tool EVA [101]
computes the overall anomaly scores and sub-scores according
to different standards. If the overall score of transactions
exceeds a threshold, the transactions are highlighted in red
in the parallel coordinates view. Also, selection in another
coordinated chart highlights associated transactions and gray
out others in the parallel coordinates view. When analysts
click a node of interest, relevant data that are originally not
visualized is displayed [107]. This helps analysts discover
interesting features that are not apparent from one view, and
identify different relationships between data instances. A sim-
ilar operation is seen in [111], where the selection of one node
adds related employees (i.e., nodes) into the visualization.
Thus, frauds carried out by two or more employees can be
tracked.
VisImpact [99], [105] supports simultaneous browsing and
navigation of multiple nodes. Details of a single node repre-
senting a transaction record can be obtained using the drill-
down function. For the transaction of an account, transac-
tions can be aggregated in terms of day, week, or month
in WireVis [108], [109]. Zooming is enabled in the heat
map and temporal chart view. One can also drill down to
individuals and compare their records against each other in
WireVis. Network Explorer [113] includes an overview and
an egocentric mode which detects important clusters and
individual nodes, respectively. In the overview mode, analysts
can navigate to one cluster and compute sub-communities on
demand. In the egocentric mode, analysts navigate nodes using
the direct-walk from a starting point.
Pattern discovery is often used to help identify anomalous
behaviors. Filtering in WireVis [108], [109] is conducted using
a set of keywords and criteria like amounts of words. An-
alysts can select reasonably sized subsets for re-clustering to
generate clusters that exhibit interesting features. Furthermore,
the color scheme is chosen depending on the characteristic
(e.g., sequential or diverging) of the measurement in the heat
map. Jigsaw [110] allows involvement in defining clusters of
text documents, removing false positives, adjusting the number
of words shown, and reordering the entity list. Dragging,
merging, and splitting visual elements are often seen in node-
link visualization [107], [114], [103], [113]. To discover the
tax evasion behaviors [114], analysts can merge and split
node-link representation. A selection of subgraphs is ranked
according to criteria such as the total amount of economic
transactions or the risk index. Additionally, analysts can define
and draw suspicious graph patterns using pre-defined opera-
tors.
A few visualization tools support exporting analyzed results.
The Event Tunnel [100] contains a snapshot management
console that captures the current state and configuration.
Argyriou et al. [115], [111] design the exporting function in
the visual analytics tools for detecting occupational frauds. The
ranking results of anomalousness can be exported in separate
log files. The visualization containing suspicious transaction
patterns can be stored for post-analysis.
Visual analytics involve domain knowledge into the pro-
cess of anomaly detection. Analysts are enabled to reassign
labels of the “structure hole spanner” during interactive ex-
ploration [103]. The structure hole spanner interlinks different
communities in a network, which can be modified through
merging and splitting operations. High default groups are
found to be associated with these labels. In TAXNET [114],
analysts can define graph patterns based on their understanding
of tax evasion frauds. Textual labels are attached to the
graphs to describe rules for nodes (i.e., taxpayers) or edges
(i.e., relationship).
VIII. DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK
In this section, we first summarize trends of research interest
in the community of data visualization regarding anomalous
user behaviors. We then discuss our findings regarding data
types, anomaly detection techniques, visualization techniques,
and interaction methods across different user behaviors.
A. Visual Analytics of Anomalous User Behaviors
Visual analytics of private social interaction behaviors
related to emailing received substantial attention in 2000s
but showed significant decreases since then. Recent research
works [117], [26] are more interested in the social network
structures found in emailing, calling behaviors. A clear trend
worth noticing is the popularity in analyzing public social
interaction behaviors related to posting in social media since
2010. The volume of social media data ensures wide cover-
age of people’s behaviors including anomalous and normal
behaviors. Application to real world is attractive from the
perspective of social science and possibly more. We have seen
many visualization tools that address event detection from
massive information, information spreading, and identification
of social bots. However, to the best of our knowledge, we
found that only a few visualization works [45] focuses on
secretive or collusive anomalous behaviors, when compared to
machine learning approaches [3] that detect suspicious behav-
iors. Specifically, we have not seen visual analytics methods
for detecting social Sybil attacks (i.e., astroturfing) [118] or
private information inference [119] related to the posting
behavior. We are hoping to see more efforts to be put in
discovering anomalous behaviors conducted in a collusive,
secretive manner.
As for network communication, the research interest remains
relatively strong, though classical works [78], [85] that analyze
this behavior are mostly published in 2000s. Visual analytics
of network communication focuses on aggregating different
levels of data as well as real-time monitoring. Aggregation of
data is often used to monitor high-level structures of networks
and at the same time, to visualize anomalies in an interface
of limited space. As data sources of audit logs and network
traffic provide detailed and systematic information, attacks are
often traceable to individual machines even though malicious
activities originate from more than one device. In addition,
the preference for real-time or near-real-time monitoring in
intrusion detection [120] is emphasized, manifested by the
realization of analyzing streaming data in many visualizations.
This results from the need for timely detection of malicious
attacks. As computing abilities advance, we expect to see more
visualization tools that can handle streaming data.
Travel receives continuous attention of researchers given
that more data is available for analysis (mobile phones [69],
geo-located messages [121], maritime search and rescue
events [70]). Though visualization techniques used for analyz-
ing travel behaviors are similar (i.e., geographic visualization),
a rich set of interaction methods is implemented in order to
detect and comprehend anomalies [69], [62]. By analyzing
patterns in user-specified spatial and temporal ranges, analysts
study user behaviors in multiple levels of granularity to and
fro, and gradually develop their understanding during interac-
tive exploration. As more and more sensors are available in
daily life, we hope to finer segmentation of groups of people
to offer an accurate description of travel patterns.
Visualization works regarding anomalous transaction be-
haviors modernizes traditional visual methods in the financial
field. For example, EVA [101] integrates human decisions into
the analysis of frauds into the existing alert system. In recent
years, we have seen an increased number of visualization tools
designed for detecting suspicious users involved in financial
transactions. However, by comparing the average number of
citations between user behaviors, the overall research interest
in financial transactions is less than those in travel behaviors,
for example. Privacy issues can largely limit the resources
available for research. Having said that, we are hoping to see
more in-depth collaboration between academic researchers and
financial institutes to resolve transaction frauds by recognizing
fraudsters’ behaviors.
B. Data Types
Application of multidimensional data to anomaly detection
can be found across four behaviors. It offers a variety of
features for detecting anomalous behaviors and is often used
in conjunction with other data types. Text is an important
data type for detecting abnormal social interaction behaviors,
whereas text is a compliment in the analysis of other user
behaviors. Text provides information about identities and
backgrounds of objects involved, which is used to categorize
objects. Network is used frequently in the analysis of network
communication as well as social interaction behaviors. Links
exist in cyber networks between sources and destinations, and
social networks between senders and receivers. Spatiotemporal
information enriches skeletons of analysis by incorporating
contextual information of users’ travel behaviors. Detection of
anomalous transaction and social interaction behaviors often
incorporates temporal analysis.
Analysis based on data types helps indicate overlapping
areas between user behaviors, which is a signal of borrow-
ing analytics approaches from other behaviors. For example,
exploration of rating behaviors in online e-commerce stores
is similar to that of network security problems. Sensitivity
to time-critical behaviors in anomaly detection is emphasized
in [44], in which streaming data is processed. Network be-
tween sources and destinations is found in network com-
munication, whilst network between users and items is also
important for discovering rating frauds. We see a trend of
incorporating multiple types of data. Since anomaly detection
problems often encounter unknown ill-defined anomalies, us-
age of all four data types can create a relatively thorough
picture for investigation.
C. Anomaly Detection Techniques
Statistical techniques are most widely used. The principle of
employing statistical techniques is more intuitive compared to
the other techniques: data that are not described by the known
distribution are anomalous. For example, a majority of network
communication behaviors are studied using statistical tech-
niques. Detection techniques for cyber attacks are classified
into signature-based and anomaly-based [10], both of which
can be applied with statistical-based approaches. Clustering-
based techniques are often used in studying travel and trans-
action behaviors. Clustering is often employed to tackle large-
scale databases associated with travel behaviors. Clustering
methods in transactions divide customers into groups based
on the assumption that abnormal behaviors are found outside
the clusters. Nearest neighbor-based techniques are applied to
detecting anomalous social interaction behavior. For example,
in graphs composed of senders and/or receivers in associated
with emailing and calling, anomaly scores are computed from
distance or densities.
We expect to see more visualization tools to employ
anomaly detection techniques such as machine learning ap-
proaches in the future. The effectiveness of machine learning
methods in visualization is well-recognized [122]. Though the
time interval between the release of detection techniques and
the implementation in visualization might be long (e.g., a
five-year interval for FraudVis [45] to apply the CopyCatch
[123] algorithm), we believe machine learning techniques are
of great value for anomaly detection in visualization. Recently,
Chalapathy and Chawla survey [12] deep learning techniques
for anomaly detection. For example, Malhotra et al. [124]
develop a Long Short Term Memory Networks based Encoder-
Decoder scheme for Anomaly Detection (EncDec-AD) that
is able to uncover predictable, unpredictable, periodic, and
aperiodic in long and short time series. Anomalies in mul-
tivariate time-series data are uncovered using a Multi-Scale
Convolutional Recurrent Encoder-Decoder (MSCRED) [125],
which can capture dynamics and encode the inter-correlations
between different pairs of time series.
D. Visualization Techniques
Among graph visualization, node-link diagram is mostly
used in social interaction, transaction, and network communi-
cation. Node-link diagram is advantageous in its traceability
from one node to the other. It is capable of tracking down to
abnormal individuals from email and call records, to individual
machines in malicious cyber attacks, and to a pair of employee
and client in financial frauds. Text visualization is favored
in the analysis of public social interaction behaviors such as
posting. These visualization tools are usually equipped with
views showing text data to enable interactive exploration and
affirmation of suspicious events or users. For example, to
complement inspection of microblogs, original messages and
keywords are often found in a table format or tag clouds [126],
[34]. Detection of anomalous transaction behaviors also uses
sequence visualization such as parallel coordinates. Variations
of the relationship between subsequent events can be tracked
by changes of linkage between two successive axes, which
suggest suspicious transactions occurred. Varied configurations
of parallel coordinates include radar chart and Sankey diagram.
To illustrate social interaction behaviors, changes of heights
and size of bubbles in timeline visualization are used to
encode sudden and/or important changes in the volume of
keywords. Geographic visualization is often used to represent
travel behaviors as it has the advantage of illustrating two-
dimensional physical movement. Flows and bubbles projection
on a map show differences in traveling directions and spatial
densities of distribution. Heat map is popular to demonstrate
spatial densities of humans and vehicles, as it minimizes
visual occlusion that may happen in flows/bubbles projection
on maps. Chart visualization is effective in illustrating well-
understood anomalies as long as dimensions of the displays
are selected properly.
We also found that the number of visualization works
that address egocentric behavior forms is much fewer than
those studying collective behavior forms. Glyph visualization
is suited to visualizing egocentric behaviors as differences in
individuals’ roles can be identified more efficiently. Visualiza-
tions of collective behaviors take a variety of representations
To better explain, we use an example in social media where the
same user behavior results in problems viewed from egocentric
and collective perspectives, respectively. Both FluxFlow [32]
and Episogram [52] analyze retweeting behaviors in Twitter.
FluxFlow emphasizes the information diffusion process and
visualizes temporal evolution of a group of retweeted mi-
croblogs using packed colored circles. Episogram, on the other
hand, considers whether a Twitter account is anomalous by
comparing one’s individual retweeting patterns with others’.
A user is represented as a glyph, which is later found to be
used as a typical visualization for egocentric behavior form.
The trend of applying visualization techniques to detecting
anomalous user behaviors is summarized as follows. Node-
link diagram has long been a popular choice of visualizing
anomalous user behaviors. It is still a favored technique
as it is effective to present an overall structure as well as
detailed information when incorporated with rich interaction
techniques. Circular-based designs are gaining attention from
researchers for its ability to show connections in a packed
visualization, where hierarchical structure is displayed using
bundles and tree layout inside the ring. Also, circular-based
designs usually represent structures of larger-scale than those
(e.g., stars, cliques) in node-link structures.
We observed an increasing trend of using heat maps when
compared to flows/bubbles/3D projection on a map. The
reason may be that flows/bubbles/3D map result in visual
occlusion, which can only be resolved with appropriate in-
teraction techniques. The opposite trend to that of heat map
can be explained by its potential to visualize large-scale data
with geographic references. It is able to encode some degree of
geographical information, and at the same time, variables such
as density of users, anomaly degree can be encoded on the map
without occlusion. Interest in applying chart visualization has
decreased in recent years. Chart visualization is restricted to a
few variables, which is ineffective in anomaly detection when
an analysis of multiple variables is required.
E. Interaction Methods
Exploration & navigation has been the most popular interac-
tion task in visual analytics of anomalous user behaviors. Most
visualization tools support users to gain a high-level summary
of large-scale data first and then drill down to anomalies on
request. The second most popular interaction task is tracking
& monitoring. As the papers surveyed are related to anomaly
detection, keeping track of suspicious spots is important during
interactive exploration. Analysts also highlight data of interest
to show its correlation between in the coordinated views,
which helps form a picture of where anomalies originate
from. Pattern discovery is also frequently used. During the
process, the visual representation of data changes accordingly.
These updates of one’s knowledge drive analysts to construct
hypotheses of anomalies.
We observe trends of utilizing interaction tasks in different
user behaviors. Visualization works that study travel behavior
often incorporate exploration & navigation in map visual-
ization. The reason is that panning on a map is seen often
when tracking physical movement [59], [72]. Pattern discovery
illustrates more than one abnormal feature of anomalies by
changing color spectrum and representing traveling patterns in
various forms on a map [47], [62]. Also, filtering by keywords
is seen in social interaction [44], [34], [27], [127] where textual
contents are important for determining anomalies. Knowledge
externalization is usually seen in network communication [90],
[80] and transactions [108], [111]. This interaction task en-
ables the processed results to be outputted for further analysis
and validation with domain experts.
We increasingly see visualization tools involve refinement
& identification in rendering visualization. This type of inter-
action goes beyond the definition of interaction methods [24]
because adjustments in anomaly detection algorithms are al-
lowed (e.g., Filter technique). Several research works allow
analysts to adjust parameters in constructing queries [62], [38],
changing thresholds of anomalies [44], [69], and updating
feedback in anomalies [59]. Visual representation is modified
due to fundamental calculation rather than the adjustment
of visual encoding. These works facilitate visual analytics
by involving human perception and interpretation into the
computation process of anomaly detection, which is a deeper
level of computer-human interaction than those identified in
[24].
IX. CONCLUSION
In this work, we present a survey of visual analytics of
anomalous user behaviors. We analyze the related the-state-
of-art according to the proposed taxonomies. Our survey sug-
gests trends and preferences in data types, anomaly detection
techniques, visualization techniques, and interaction methods.
With these findings, we also highlight potential research
directions. We believe our work shed light on understanding
and analyzing anomalous user behaviors using visual analytics
approaches.
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